Since it is impossible to be all inclusive and cover every aspect of the design/validation process, this document can be used as a basis for preparation of a more comprehensive and detailed plan that reflects the accumulated "lessons learned" at a particular company. The following areas are addressed in this document: 1. Contemporary perspective including common validation issues and flaws. 2. A Robustness Validation (RV) process based on SAE J1211 handbook and SAE J2628. 3. Design checklists to aid in such a RV process.
This interface document SAE J2286 revises the requirements for file formats as were originally described in SAE J1924. This document describes Interface 1 (I/F 1) in SAE J2461. This document does not imply the use of a specific hardware interface, but may be used with other hardware interfaces such as SAE J1939, ISO 15765 or ISO 14229. The requirements of SAE J2286 supersede the requirements defined by SAE J1924. SAE J2461 establishes the requirements for Interface 1 (I/F 1), as a replacement of the file-based interface described by SAE J1924, as shown by Figure 1. Interface 1 (I/F) is a bi-directional link between the OEM Shop Floor Program (CSCI 1) and the Vendor Component Program (CSCI 2). Using I/F 1, the OEM Shop Floor Program communicates the desired parameters and programming limits for an assembly job to the Vendor Component Program (VCP). In response, the VCP returns programming results to the OEM Shop Floor Program (CSCI 1).
This SAE Recommended Practice applies to all portions of the vehicle, but design efforts should focus on components and systems with the highest contribution to the overall average repair cost (see 3.7). The costs to be minimized include not only insurance premiums, but also out-of-pocket costs incurred by the owner. Damageability, repairability, serviceability and diagnostics are inter-related. Some repairability, serviceability and diagnostics operations may be required for collision or comprehensive loss-related causes only, some operations for non-collision-related causes only (warranty, scheduled maintenance, non-scheduled maintenance, etc.), and some for both causes. The scope of this document deals with only those operations that involve collision and comprehensive insurance loss repairs.
Guideline for Development of Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Systems
This document contains guidance for implementing a counterfeit mitigation program in adherence with AS5553B.
Bolts and Screws, Nickel Alloy UNS N07718, Classification: 185 ksi/1200 °F, Procurement Specification
This procurement specification covers bolts and screws made from a corrosion and heat resistant, age hardenable nickel base alloy of the type identified under the Unified Numbering System as UNS N07718.
This classification system tabulates the properties of vulcanized rubber materials (natural rubber, reclaimed rubber, synthetic rubbers, alone or in combination) that are intended for, but not limited to, use in rubber products for automotive applications. NOTE 1: The SAE Committee on Automotive Rubber Specifications (CARS) has the sole responsibility for SAE J200. CARS Works closely with and receives input from ASTM Subcommittee D11.30 on Classification of Rubber Compounds with the goal to keep SAE J200 and ASTM D 2000 technically equivalent. Candidate materials presented for development of new tables or for inclusion in Tables A1 or A2 of SAE J200 or Table X1.1 of ASTM D 2000 shall be initiated with the SAE CARS Committee. The procedure to be followed is detailed in Appendix C of SAE J200. NOTE 2: This document may serve many of the needs of other industries in much the same manner as SAE numbered steels.
This SAE Recommended Practice identifies and defines terms specifically related to brake systems.
This standard defines uniform quality and technical requirements relative to metallic parts marking performed using "data matrix symbology" within the aviation, space, and defense industry. ISO/IEC 16022 specifies general requirements (e.g., data character encodation, error correction rules, decoding algorithm). In addition to ISO/IEC 16022 specification, part identification with such symbology is subject to the requirements in this standard to ensure electronic reading of the symbol. The marking processes covered by this standard are as follows: - Dot Peening - Laser - Electro-Chemical Etching Further marking processes will be included, if required. Unless specified otherwise in the contractual business relationship, the company responsible for the design of the part shall determine the location of the data matrix marking. Symbol position should allow optimum illumination from all sides for readability. This standard does not specify information to be encoded.
This SAE Recommended Practice presents a method and example results for determining the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) for automotive electrical and electronic (E/E) systems. This activity is required by ISO 26262-3:2011 , and it is intended that the process and results herein are consistent with ISO 26262:2011 . The technical focus of this document is on vehicle motion control systems. It is limited to passenger cars weighing up to 3.5 metric tons. Furthermore, the scope of this recommended practice is limited to collision-related hazards. ISO 26262:2011  has a wider scope than SAE J2980, covering other functions and accidents (not just motion control or collisions as in SAE J2980).
This document describes requirements for standardized processes (and associated technologies) that ensure type design data are retrievable and usable for the life of a type certificate (50+ years). These processes are primarily concerned with, but not limited to, digital type design data retained in threedimensional representations and associated data that is required for complete product definition, such as tolerances, specification call-outs, product structure and configuration control data, etc. This process standard includes process requirements for managing the evolution of technologies required to ensure the availability of the data for the life of the product. This data must be available to meet regulatory, legal, contractual and business requirements. This process standard is not intended to incorporate every company specific requirement and does not dictate specific organizational structures within a company.
Historically SAE has been concerned with nomenclature as an integral part of the standards development process. Guidelines for automotive nomenclature were written in 1916, were last revised in 1941, and were included in the SAE Handbook until 1962. The present diversity of groups working on nomenclature in the various ground vehicle committees led to the organization of the Nomenclature Advisory Committee under SAE Automotive Council.
Fibre Channel is the primary avionics bus on many modern military aircraft. It is also the defined High-Speed bus for MIL-STD-1760E weapons applications. Profiled Ethernet networks are the primary avionics bus in many commercial aircraft and Commercial Ethernet is an ever increasing presence in modern military aircraft as well. This network standard is a convergence of Fibre Channel and Ethernet into a unified network standard which will provide a seamless approach to integrating end systems from either technology into a merged network structure. This work is based upon the commercial data storage market industry’s work on the Converged Data Storage Network or FCoE (Fibre Channel over Ethernet). This effort will look at profiling the FCoE work done in the commercial industry and adding information where necessary to affect a networking standard that will seamlessly integrate end systems from Commercial Ethernet, Fibre Channel, or FCoE enhanced devices.
This standard only defines interconnect, electrical and logical (functional) requirements for the interface between a Micro Munition and the Host. The physical and mechanical interface between the Micro Munition and Host is undefined. Individual programs will define the relevant requirements for physical and mechanical interfaces in the Interface Control Document (ICD) or system specifications. It is acknowledged that this does not guarantee full interoperability of Interface for Micro Munitions (IMM) interfaces until further standardization is achieved.
The terms included in the Glossary are general in nature and may not apply to all manufacturers' systems. All terms in Section 3 apply to automotive inflatable restraint systems in general which are initiated by an electric or mechanical stimulus upon receipt of a signal from a sensor. These terms are intended to reflect existing designs and the Glossary will be updated as information on other types of systems becomes available. Appendix A is included to identify terminology that is no longer in common use or specifically applicable to inflatable restraint systems, but was published in the December 2001 version of SAE J1538.
Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition - DistributorsCounterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance Protocol, Distributors
This SAE Aerospace Standard standardizes practices to: a. identify reliable sources to procure parts, b. assess and mitigate risk of distributing fraudulent/counterfeit parts, c. control suspect or confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts, d. and report suspect and confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts to other potential users and Authority Having Jurisdiction.
Guidelines for Requests Received from Outside Sources for the CONAG Council to Originate or Review Technical Reports
This SAE Information Report lists the method which outside sources will follow when submitting documents for origination or review by the SAE CONAG Council.
This SAE Standard includes names of major components and parts peculiar to this type of machine. Illustrations used here are not intended to include all existing commercial machines or be exactly descriptive of any particular machine. They have been provided to describe the principles to be used in applying this document.
The purpose of this document is to provide information and guidelines for use by automotive designers, test engineers and policymakers with…
The aviation, space, and defense industries rely on the development and manufacture of complex products comprised of multiple systems, subsystems, and components each designed by individual designers (design activities) at various levels within the supply chain. Each design activity controls various aspects of the configuration and specifications related to the product. When a change to design information is requested or required, the change has to be evaluated against the impacts to the higher-level system. Proposed changes to design information that the design activity identifies to be minor and have no effect on their product requirements or specifications have the potential to be concurrently implemented and approved, where authorized to do so. Changes that affect customer mandated requirements or specifications must be approved prior to implementation.
This document describes an evaluation method which measures the effectiveness of a specified test plan used to screen for counterfeit parts. The method includes the determination of the types of defects detected using a specified test plan along with the related counterfeit type coverage. The output of this evaluation will produce the counterfeit defect coverage (CDC), the not-covered defects (NCD), the under-covered defects (UCD), and the counterfeit type coverage (CTC). This information will be supplied to the test laboratory’s customer in both the test report and the Certificate of Quality Conformance. This evaluation method does not address the effectiveness of detecting tampered type devices.
This SAE Standard is intended to describe the basic types of felling heads, including those with bunching capabilities, that are attachments to a self-propelled machine. Only the major components that are necessary to describe the functions to the felling head, and to apply the principles of the recommended practice are included. Illustrations used are not intended to include all existing felling heads or to describe any particular manufacturer's variation.
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) Test Methods
This document defines capabilities and limitations of FTIR as it pertains to counterfeit electronic component detection and suggests possible applications to these ends. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of FTIR including: operator training, sample preparation, various sampling techniques, data interpretation, computerized spectral matching including pass/fail criteria, equipment maintenance, and reporting of data. The discussion is primarily aimed at analyses performed in the mid-infrared (IR) from 400 to 4000 wavenumbers; however, many of the concepts are applicable to the near and far IR.
The scope of this document is to: 1. Specify techniques to detect suspect SFC parts using electrical testing. 2. Provide various levels of electrical testing that can be used by end user to define test plans for detecting SFC parts. 3. Provide guidelines to end users for determining which test houses have the necessary capabilities. (i.e., equipment, procedures and protocols) for performing electrical testing for authenticity analysis.
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) Test Methods
This test method provides the capabilities, limitations, and suggested possible applications of TGA as it pertains to the detection of counterfeit electronic components. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of TGA including, equipment requirements, test sample requirements, methodology, control and calibration, data analysis, reporting, and qualification and certification.
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Delid/Decapsulation Physical Analysis Test Methods
This method standardizes inspection and test procedures and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect, Fraudulent, & Counterfeit (SFC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) components or parts utilizing Delid/Decapsulation Physical Analysis. The requirements of this document are employed to either delid or remove the cover from a hermetically sealed package or to remove the outer protective coating or encapsulation of an EEE Part, in order to examine the internal structure to determine if the part appears authentic. Information derived may be used to: a. preclude installation of inauthentic parts or parts having obvious or latent defects b. aid in disposition of parts that exhibit anomalies c. aid in defining improvements or changes in design, materials, or processes d. evaluate Supplier production trends. NOTE: This test method should not be confused with Destructive Physical Analysis as defined in MIL-STD-1580.
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by External Visual Inspection, Remarking and Resurfacing, and Surface Texture Analysis Test Methods
This documenet describes the requirements of the following test methods for counterfeit detection of electronic components; General External Visual Inspection (EVI), Detailed External Visual Inspection, Remarking and Resurfacing, Lead Finish Analysis, SEM Surface Analysis.
XRF technique for counterfeit detection is applicable to electronic and other parts as listed in the AS6171 General Requirements. In general, the detection technique is meant for use on piece parts prior to assembly on a circuit board or on the parts that are removed from a circuit board. The applicability spans a large swath of active, passive and electromechanical parts.
Through the use of ultra-high frequency ultrasound, typically above 10 MHz, Acoustic Microscopy (AM) non-destructively finds and characterizes physical features and latent defects (visualization of interior features in a layer by layer process) — such as material continuity, sub-surface flaws, cracks, voids, delaminations and porosity. AM observed features and defects can be indicators that the components were improperly handled, stored, altered or previously used.
The intent of this document is to define the methodology for suspect parts inspection using radiological inspection. The purpose of radiology for suspect counterfeit part inspection is to detect deliberate misrepresentation of a part, either at the part distributor or OEM level. Radiological inspection can also potentially detect unintentional damage to the part resulting from improper removal of part from assemblies, which may include, but not limited to, prolonged elevated temperature exposure during desoldering operations or mechanical stresses during removal. Radiological inspection of electronics includes film radiography and filmless radiography such as digital radiography (DR), real time radiography (RTR), and computed tomography (CT). Radiology is an important tool used in part authentication of microelectronic devices. Radiographic analysis is performed on parts to verify that the internal package or die construction is consistent with an exemplar item.
This method outlines the requirements, capabilities, and limitations associated with the application of Design Recovery to the detection of counterfeit electronic parts including: Operator training; Sample preparation; Imaging techniques; Data interpretation; Design/functional matching including pass/fail criteria; Equipment maintenance and; Reporting of data. The method is primarily aimed at analyses performed by circuit delayering and imaging with a scanning electron microscope or optical microscope; however, many of the concepts are applicable to other microscope and probing techniques to recover design data.